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Problem	  area	  
 
Humanity has for thousands of years ventured to connect across space and time. 
Globalization is a concept designed to capture this effort at its latest stage. The 
borders between peoples that we have taken for granted since the earliest throes 
of civilization seem to be dissolving – or so do at least the (nation-)state borders 
that have been drawn and redrawn as a result of the international balance of 
power throughout modern times.  
But what if globalization is a mirage? The planet we live on still contains simple 
geographical borders such as rivers, mountains and oceans: the original borders. 
One could argue that we are less globalizing than regionalizing, and indeed going 
back to the original borders drawn by nature.  
Globalisation is a contested concept. I will therefore attempt to put the definition 
of globalisation that is used in the paper into a context of this discussion. It is 
clear that globalisation challenges the role of the state. So what is the role of the 
state?  
 
Antonio Negri1 writes about globalisation as empire: the spreading of norms across 
nation-state borders by supranational institutions such as the G8 the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU) and the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Deepak Nayar2 writes that   
 
“a new form of state is emerging, and supranational institutions, national 
states, local and regional governments, and even NGO’s are linked together 
in a network of interaction and shared decision-making that becomes the 
prevalent political form of the information age: the network state.” 
 
Also, the ties of loyalty that run from each individual are changing; perhaps they 
are more numerous too, but it is sure that the question of citizens’ sense of 
loyalty to diverse, new and old institutions is also a relevant one to ask if one 
seeks to understand why the state is losing its monopoly on decision-making and 
information.  
                                     
1	  Negri	  &	  Hardt	  (2000)	  through	  Ajay	  Gudavarthy:	  Globalisation	  and	  Regionalisation:	  Mapping	  the	  New	  Continental	  
Drift	  (2001).	  
2	  Deepak	  Nayar:	  Globalisation:	  What	  Does	  it	  Mean	  for	  Development?	  
The state, it could also be said, is becoming less relevant. Relevant still, but less 
relevant than in the 20th century. This is not necessarily to the disadvantage of 
the state because, as Manuel Castells writes3, it has become accepted to have  
 
“some erosion of national autonomy in the short term to improve economic 
performance in the medium term on the premise that, ultimately, it is 
economic strength which provides nation states with political clout in the 
international community.” 
 
Thus the devolution of sovereignty, as happens in the abovementioned 
supranational institutions, is pursued in order to further the economic affairs of 
the nation-state. But this devolvement of sovereignty does not only go to 
supranational institutions, but also to regions. While nationalism and separatism 
may press central governments to devolve power to regions such as Flanders, 
Wallonia, Catalonia and Quebec, it may actually be in the interest of the state. 
Flanders and Wallonia, for instance, are two different economies: while Flanders is 
export-driven and has consistently low unemployment rates, contributing 83% of 
total Belgian exports in 2012, Wallonia is significantly poorer, less export-driven 
and with consistently high unemployment rates. Flanders is a more modern 
economy, with Wallonia struggling to modernise an economy previously based on 
heavy industry4. 
 
In the context of the abovementioned discussion of globalisation, it is thus not 
surprising that the federal government in Brussels has devolved significant powers 
to the two regions, and that Flanders is heavily invested in economic diplomacy. 
This devolvement of powers to regions as well as supranational institutions is why 
regionalisation mechanics are also sometimes discussed as part of globalisation. It 
also ties into literature on multi-level governance, which though is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The process of regionalization is characterized and realized through the now 
widespread practice of sub-state diplomacy, or parallel diplomacy (paradiplomacy).  
 
I will use the term sub-state diplomacy, as a significant part of this practice is not 
in fact parallel, but can be complementary or cooperative (with the central 
government). The two are however used more or less interchangeably in literature 
on the subject, wherefore the word paradiplomacy may come up in quotations. 
 
                                     
3	  Castells	  (1996:	  33)	  through	  Gudavarthy	  (2001).	  
4	  European	  Commission	  Regional	  Innovation	  Reports	  on,	  respectively,	  Wallonia	  and	  Flanders.	  
Sub-state diplomacy involves regional governments – from Texas to Bavaria to 
Shandong – forging connections with state and non-state actors at all levels. Sub-
state diplomacy can be from a sub-state actor to a supranational actor (the EU), 
or to a state (Germany) or another region, a corporation or an NGO5 (etc.). 
Diplomacy	  today	  
 
When we talk about diplomacy today we often talk about securing trade 
advantages, economic opportunity – and spreading ones culture through branding 
and image building. Cultural branding may even be used to gain economic 
advantage, even if it is built primarily on identity politics.  
 
Economic diplomacy can play a significant role for any territory. Economic 
diplomacy involves any diplomatic activity dealing directly with the economy. 
Examples include investment of capital, free trade agreements, foreign aid or 
sanctions. These are instruments used to pursue a policy goal. This could be a 
positive one, such as increasing economic growth, or a negative one, for instance 
the attempts by a large contingency of Western countries to halt Iran’s alleged 
efforts to gain the capacity to build a nuclear bomb within a short time period. 
 
Identity politics, however, is not often a significant part of larger states’ foreign 
policies, but often plays a highly significant role in the diplomacy of regions.  
 
“Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or 
party affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political 
freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context. Members 
of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding their distinctiveness 
that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of greater 
self-determination.” - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy @ plato.stanford.edu 
 
These regions are often part of a larger political entity, if not two, as Flanders and 
Wallonia are (Belgium and the EU). Flanders and Wallonia only represent one per 
cent each of the total population of the EU. It could be a daunting task 
maintaining sovereignty in such an environment. Identity politics is one way for 
regional political actors to achieve, legitimize and maintain political power in the 
region.  
 
                                     
5	  Noé	  Cornago:	  ‘On	  the	  Normalization	  of	  Sub-­‐State	  Diplomacy’	  (The	  Hague	  Journal	  of	  Diplomacy,	  Special	  Issue	  on	  
Regional	  Sub-­‐State	  Diplomacy	  Today,	  2009)	  
Again, cultural diplomacy may also be used to brand the region as a place with a 
culture highly suited for business, for instance. Being welcoming to foreigners is 
one trait that a country would like to project. Denmark, for instance, has arguably 
been less adept at this than others, perhaps costing it in terms of FDI and highly 
skilled workers.  
In Belgium, etiquette is highly important. This may appeal to some, but provides a 
significant barrier to newcomers who need to learn the etiquette (and the 
language) in order to do business. A cultural diplomatic strategy may thus aim at 
downplaying this part of the local culture. From this example it should also be clear 
that the categories overlap in reality. 
Another focus point may be to, as the trend is (Silicon Valley being the role 
model), extol your culture of open-mindedness, willingness to adapt and such so 
as to signal that it is a culture suited for high value-added enterprise where 
innovation is key, as Cornago notes in the paper mentioned earlier in this paper. 
 
This type of cultural diplomacy may also be called public diplomacy, as it is 
directed at the public rather than the bureaucracy of the other political entity.   
One may use as an indicator of diplomatic activity the budget allocated to foreign 
affairs, the number of people and the number of man-hours employed, and the 
titles given to the servicemen. 
 
Diplomatic activity in the modern world can also mean having singular or several 
connected projects abroad, with aims such as the exchange of students, labour or 
capital.  
Public statements are of course merely words, but are also a type of diplomatic 
activity. They can have various degrees of significance.  
 
It is possible to look at the diplomatic activities from a qualitative and quantitative 
side as well: a quantitative focus may be about, to put it bluntly, showing off. 
Being many places at once. But when butter is spread over too much toast, it 
doesn’t taste of buttered toast, just toast. 
A qualitative focus, on the other hand, would focus more on significant and 
perhaps more long-term results than on attracting wide attention.  
Both strategies have their merits, and depending on the political entity (in this 
case regions) involved different ones will be preferred. This paper will use a blend. 
 
Sub-state diplomacy, then, is diplomacy at the sub-state level. Sub-states have a 
range of diplomatic tools at their disposal, just like states.  
Paradiplomacy refers to diplomatic activities that run parallel to the state. 
 
This paper will also look deeper into the latest developments in Flemish and 
Walloon diplomatic activity. But first, an introduction to the case, and to Flemish 
diplomacy. 
 
Immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain, there was a vacuum in terms of 
diplomatic representation in the many countries that were liberated from Soviet 
rule. It took several years for this vacuum to be filled.  
Wallonia and particularly Flanders seized the moment and opened diplomatic 
connections with the new states of Central and Eastern Europe.   
This crisis thus provided a historic opportunity for the two regions to establish 
themselves as more than just a region of a country: they became international 
actors in their own right. 
 
Another vacuum may have opened up in the years 2007-2011 (or even 2014) 
where Belgium went through a schismatic political crisis. The country was without 
government for 541 days. Not even Iraq in 2010 (249 days) comes close. This 
begs the questions: was there a vacuum? How big was it? Was it perceived as 
such, and did the Flemish and Walloon governments seize the opportunity?  
 
This paper will incorporate a case study of this crisis. It is a unique situation that is 
highly interesting in that it may provide knowledge of the way in which regions 
may develop their diplomatic activities. It will also analyse the reaction to the crisis 
of the Flemish government. 
 
The two actors perhaps most associated with sub-state diplomacy are Flanders 
and Wallonia. Together with Brussels they constitute the federal monarchy of 
Belgium. In Flanders live the Dutch-speaking Flemish, and in Wallonia the French-
speaking Walloons. The Brussels-capital region is located in Flanders but populated 
mainly by French-speaking Belgians. 
Flanders and Wallonia act within the same constitutional framework that was 
formed in the 1990’s as Belgium federalized. Both are highly active actors on the 
European and global scene. There are however significant differences between the 
activities of the two. The two regions’ foreign policies do not share many foci. 
 
The Belgian central government has devolved more powers to the regional level 
than any other federation. As the megatrend of globalisation progresses across 
the globe it becomes ever more interesting to look into the more progressive 
actors in this arena – to use as a crystal ball; to learn lessons that could be 
valuable for other regional governments as they seek to develop their diplomatic 
activities. Flanders and Wallonia are naturally prime candidates for this endeavour. 
This is not to say that other states will develop exactly as Flanders and Wallonia. 
They are nevertheless further developed in the area than any other region, and 
naturally will be looked at from other regions that wish to develop their own 
foreign policy.  
 
The next section will seek to describe Flanders by comparing the region with other 
regions with similar diplomatic systems. 
 
A region that may look at Flanders more is Catalonia.  David Criekemans6 describes 
Catalonia’s foreign policy as moving from being similar to those of a group of 
regions including Scotland and Bavaria to that of Flanders. Scotland and Bavaria, 
the separatist tendencies of Scotland aside, have a similar foreign policy structure: 
the framework set out by their respective central governments is quite 
constricted. The leeway to conduct an independent foreign policy is quite small. 
The wish, especially in Scotland’s case, to conduct an independent foreign policy 
is, however, strong. Their foreign policy is dominated by ad-hoc working groups 
that are coordinated loosely through inter-department communication; there is no 
actual foreign office. The main activity, for Scotland, is public diplomacy, meaning 
the branding of Scotland in the public’s eye as a unique political entity. Bavaria is 
mostly involved with environmental and economic cooperation in its near region.  
 
Flanders, on the other hand, has a Department of Foreign Affairs seeking to 
coordinate and integrate the foreign policy of the Flemish government. As we shall 
see, this is an on-going process that is very much prioritised by the Flemish. There 
is also leeway to do this within the current federal framework.  
 
Catalonia, heading towards the Flanders ‘model’ is seeking to further integrate its 
diplomatic conduct and promote both Catalan culture and business. It is thus, like 
Flanders, taking on the shape of a traditional nation-state foreign policy, 
encompassing several areas in a centrally integrated and coordinated manner. 
Both are also driven by quite dominant separatist movements. 
 
The likenesses are clear, and while generalisation may be difficult, the two being at 
different stages in their development, there is likely something significant for 
Catalonia to learn from Flanders.  
 
                                     
6	  David	  Criekemans	  (2008):	  Are	  the	  boundaries	  between	  paradiplomacy	  and	  diplomacy	  watering	  down?	  Pages	  6-­‐9	  
The study of diplomatic vacuums opening up into which regions may go into is an 
interesting way in which regions may develop significant diplomatic ties. Other 
regions may not find themselves in a situation with no federal government, but 
they may find themselves in a situation where there the framework in which they 
pursue their foreign policy undergoes a crisis.  
Another crisis is when states spring into existence, such as with the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, or the coming into existence of the state of South Sudan. There is then a 
diplomatic vacuum, since the federal government has no embassy there. Also, 
Myanmar has recently opened its economy, prompting Flanders to send several 
high-profile trade missions to the country. This is another example of utilising 
political vacuums. 
 
When the potential of such moments is utilised, one may describe it as a critical 
juncture. COP15 in Copenhagen may have been a critical juncture. There was 
certainly an atmosphere of crisis. In the same line, undertaking diplomatic missions 
in the former Eastern bloc may have been a critical juncture for Flanders, leading 
them down a path to more independency. 
 
These UN meetings are an example of a newer forum where Flanders may have its 
voice heard. A greater plurality of voices is included in the debate since the Cold 
War. Regions have seen global institutions as opportunities to pursue having their 
own voice. The EU and the US both have systems that grant regions a wide set of 
prerogatives.  
 
This paper will therefore look at what lessons for other actors there are to find in 
the diplomatic activity of Flanders and Wallonia. It will distinguish between the 
two, as they have different foci, and by defining each in opposition to each other, 
the paper will hopefully be able to produce some salient conclusions that can 
benefit regional governments in Europe and across the globe. 
 
 
Hypotheses	  
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Flanders remains more focused on economic diplomacy in the near-
area: the Netherlands and Central and Eastern Europe, but is shifting 
its focus to other areas. 
 
Flanders is a major exporter, and its main market is the European Union. After the 
fall of the Iron Curtain, the Flemish government (ibid) saw an opportunity to 
develop new markets for their exports in the former Soviet bloc. The Flemish 
supported education, good governance and market liberalisation. Insofar as this 
bloc of countries has now been admitted into the EU, this task has been 
completed – or taken over by the EU. I thus expect to find that while its contacts 
in the region remain strong, it is not a priority as it used to be 7. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2  
 
Flanders’ is expanding its diplomatic activities. 
 
The political sphere in Flanders is dominated by separatism, which may be 
translated into ventures on the foreign policy stage. Also, its activities have been 
expanding for some decades. All else equal this trend should continue. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
The regional government of Flanders perceived a vacuum in the 541 
days with no central government. They sought to fil l this vacuum.   
 
A rationally acting institution would, given the chance, seek to expand its power. 
So goes rational historical institutionalist theory. This led to this third hypothesis, 
and to the next:  
 
 
	  
Alternative hypothesis 
 
The regional government of Flanders perceived a vacuum, but did not 
seek to fil l it out due to institutional norms. 
 
While one might expect the regional governments to grab at any chance to 
expand the scope of their diplomatic activities, it is also possible that a degree of 
path dependence was present in the period 2010-11. Institutional norms 
established over time would then have constrained the regional governments from 
expanding into this vacuum. In the case that Flanders did not seize the 
                                     
7	  David	  Criekemans:	  How	  subnational	  entitites	  try	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  ‘paradiplomacy’.	  The	  case	  of	  Flanders	  
(1993-­‐2005):	  9)	  
opportunity presented by the vacuum, I believe that this explanation is the most 
likely. 
 
	  Research	  questions	  
 
1. Have the focus points of Flemish foreign policy changed over the past five 
years? 
2. Is Flanders developing a more independent foreign policy? 
a. Is Flanders expanding its diplomatic activities? 
3. Did Flanders perceive, and fill a foreign policy vacuum in the 541 days with 
no government? 
Literature	  review	  
 
Much research has been directed at uncovering the differences between the 
structural frameworks of the two regions’ foreign services. The institutional 
framework has also naturally been heavily scrutinized since the federalization 
process first began two decades ago.  
The diplomatic practices of Flanders have also been looked at in depth, though not 
since 2010. Since then, Belgium has lived through a major political crisis and 
Flanders has made major steps to develop its Department of Foreign Affairs.  
This paper wishes to continue this research, to plug any holes and to update it. 
New developments beg updated research. 
 
Sub-state diplomacy has been around for more than a century, but surged in the 
1980s as a number of regional governments initiated own policies to attract FDI8,9. 
This ‘wave’ (ibid) was of course characterised by immaturity: ad hoc policies and 
little integration across the initiatives. On the one hand, as the globe is made 
metaphorically smaller, globalisation enables more diplomacy to be initiated more 
easily. One the other, more globalisation also means more competition for market 
share, instigating the creation of new practices for economies of all scales, from 
city to continent, to stay competitive. Globalisation both promotes and constrains 
diversity. 
In the 1990s – with Belgium leading the pack – sub-state entities gradually 
attained judicial legitimacy to perform own diplomatic activities. With this, they 
could create coordinating agencies. 
 
                                     
8	  David	  Criekemans:	  Foreign	  policy	  and	  Diplomacy	  of	  the	  Belgian	  Regions:	  Flanders	  and	  Wallonia	  (Netherlands	  
Institute	  of	  International	  Relations	  ‘Clingendael’,	  2010)	  
9	  Paquin	  and	  LaChapelle:	  ‘Why	  Do	  Substates	  and	  Regions	  Practice	  International	  Relations?’	  
As the globalisation mechanics continue to exert their effect, and nationalist 
sentiments being strong as ever, a third wave in the maturation of sub-state 
diplomacy can be identified through the following markers:  
First, the development of foreign offices with enough manpower to coordinate the 
activities and indeed take on the shape of traditional foreign offices, with all 
diplomatic activity under one office/ministry. This allows for an integrated regional 
and, potentially, also federal foreign policy, mitigating the chance that initiatives 
work against each other and increasing the opportunity to have them work with 
each other towards a unified goal.  
Second, an increased willingness to take on political areas such as foreign aid and 
trade that previously were the domain of central governments.  
 
Vengroff and Rich have looked at the subject through the lens of globalisation, 
finding that Quebec and Flanders are very much focused on carving out niches in 
the global economy10. Quebec, for instance, is famous for its bet on video game 
development – some of the biggest players in the sector are French, and now 
French-Canadian. The Flemish economy is based on exportable services and high 
value-added goods. Flemish exports account for a large part of Belgium’s total 
GDP11.  
Interestingly, they note “public opinion specialists” observe “the key explanation 
for the growing support toward sovereignty in the last 25 years is the decrease in 
the risks associated with Quebec independence”. I.e. as global economics becomes 
less constricted by state borders, the perceived risks of breaking ties with the 
central government (Brussels, Ottawa) decreases. 
 
Andrew Petter, a diplomat and academic, has noted that the significant multi-level 
governance structures in Europe take away a certain amount of trade and 
investment promotion opportunities but in turn the EU provides a balancing force 
to the market12. Thus, regions such as Flanders are left with more energy to 
“harness state power and promote creative policies.” 
In Canada, for comparison, there is plenty of leeway for paradiplomatic efforts 
“but because of the weaker governance structure these efforts are almost wholly 
reactions to the evolution of the market.”  
Cornago agrees with this point, characterising the NAFTA and the WTO 
frameworks as leaving little space for sub-state diplomacy. 
                                     
10	  Richard	  Vengroff	  &	  Jason	  Rich:	  ‘Paradiplomacy	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Provinces’,	  University	  of	  Connecticut	  &	  
American	  Political	  Science	  Association,	  2004	  
11	  Flanders	  Investment	  and	  Trade,	  Government	  of	  Flanders	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Interestingly, Petter disagrees with André Lecours’ belief that sub-state diplomatic 
activities are motivated “mainly by nationalism”, but concludes that Quebec’s 
efforts at least are mainly motivated by economic globalisation (ibid). 
This could tempt one to ask if it were the same in Flanders.  
Flanders, an economically strong region, could even see nationalism and economic 
globalisation driving each other, as globalisation highlights and increases the 
differences between the two regions. It is indeed often mentioned in press 
releases that Flanders trade missions seek to highlight the unique things that its 
economy has to offer. This would then drive its diplomatic activities.  
 
Returning to Vengroff and Rich, they also write extensively of the motivation that 
market forces provide for Canadian regions as a whole (not just Quebec) to pursue 
diplomacy independent of Ottawa. 
 
Noé Cornago has looked specifically on the spread of sub-state diplomacy across 
the world13. He has fashioned a typology of four different ways in which sub-state 
diplomacy is normalised.  
One way is the spread of values through socialisation among foreign servicemen 
through various forms of communication: email, conferences etc.  
 
Another is the building of institutions that directly or indirectly promote the 
practice. These can provide the framework for socialisation, or directly promote 
the utilisation of sub-state diplomatic tools. 
A prime example is the EU initiative InterReg (between regions) funded by the 
European Regional Development Fund that “aims to improve the effectiveness of 
regional policies and instruments” through supporting “innovation and the 
knowledge economy, environment and risk prevention”.  
Indeed, going back to the first process of normalisation, knowledge 
sharing/socialisation, networking activities and the exchange of experience are 
among the “typical tools” utilised by InterReg14. They also provide an online “Good 
practices database.” 
 
The fourth way of normalisation relates to the above structures and involves 
contentious legislation: sub-state entities pushing the boundaries of legislative 
frameworks, sometimes to the dislike of central governments, whereupon the 
courts take over.  
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 Institutionalism	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  explain	  sub-­‐state	  diplomacy	  
 
The aim of this paper is not to explain the development of sub-state diplomacy as 
such, or how it is spread. However, it may be wise to outline the deductive-
theoretical context into which this project lies. One aspect of this is the in-depth 
descriptive research on the development of sub-state diplomacy, and whether 
paradiplomacy is a term that should be replaced by sub-state diplomacy. 
Another is the discussion as to how to explain the development of sub-state 
diplomacy. Peter Bursens and Jana Deforche have argued15 that literature on the 
matter has not yet provided “satisfactory explanations for the development of 
regional foreign activities”, and that complementing the concepts created through 
the descriptive work with historical institutionalism “can account for the variation 
in the development of foreign policy powers of sub-national entities.”  
Research up to now (see for instance Cornago) has often sought to explain the 
development of sub-state diplomacy through the interplay of two opposing forces: 
the central government, seeking to constrict, and the, or indeed any regional 
government seeking to expand opportunities to pursue regional objectives 
independently. Multi-level governance structures such as the EU, NAFTA or the 
WTO may prohibit or promote sub-state diplomacy. Keating16 and Soldatos17 have 
previously outlined the importance of both internal (attracting FDI, opening trade, 
culture, and nationalist longing for recognition) as well as the external factors such 
as multi-level governance structures. 
 
Bursons and Deforche wish to explain why the judicial frameworks evolve as they 
do: why some regions within the same governance structure (like Wallonia and 
Flanders) are granted competencies and some are not. They propose to do this 
using historical institutionalist (HI) theory, inspired by how multi-level governance 
research has utilised HI.  
Bursons and Deforche then proceed to look for empirical evidence of the validity 
of HI in explaining why regions are “granted” a particular level and a particular kind 
of foreign policy. They conclude that they are following a trend in which they place 
Soldatos, Keating and Lecours; that the internal and external “contexts” are 
essentially HI concepts in different packaging.  
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They do find empirical evidence to support the validity of HI in this area, citing 
critical junctures such as the “de facto creation of a dual competitive federal 
system in 1970” and the introduction of the in foro interno in foro externo18 
principle. 
They outline how they see HI utilised in their conclusion: first, one maps how much 
foreign policy autonomy the actors aspire to, and what diplomatic tools they use. 
Variations would then be explained with hard, soft19, internal and external variables 
that enable or constrain the actors’ behaviour, as well as critical junctures such as 
those mentioned above. 
 
The ‘two opposing forces’ explanation used explicitly by Cornago and implicitly by 
others such as Keating and Soldatos may be interpreted as rational choice 
institutionalism: actors’ preferences are fixed, and institutions may either prohibit 
or promote their achieving their objectives. In RI theory, there may be both 
internal and external drivers. The external institutions, that is, are not necessarily 
only a constraining: they may also act as enablers. 
Thus goes the dominant intellectual trend in research on this theme.  
 
Saying that developments are driven by two opposing forces of course does not 
come near creating a theoretical framework. Thus Bursons and Deforche can be 
seen as attempting to continue an intellectual trend in the field and elaborating it 
in to a framework. Their work continues the work of others in seeking to explain 
the development of sub-state diplomacy as the result of the regional governments 
working within a multi-level governance structure and is a step forward in creating 
a theoretical base for deductive research in this field. 
This paper will (also) seek to explain the differences within Belgium as the result of 
the regional governments working to further their objectives within a framework 
set by Brussels, i.e. the central government and the EU. 
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 Methods	  
This paper’s analysis is two-pronged, but the two tracks will meet again in the 
conclusive section.  
 
Academic research in this area often concerns the relationship between domestic 
politics and the division of power between the two layers of governance – i.e. 
central and regional. This usually means studying and providing an overview of the 
legal framework within regional governments act.  
 
It may also, as this paper does, look at the way in which sub-state actors actually 
are active on the international scene. It may ask what of the diplomatic 
instruments available to regions they actually use. Where they push the legal 
boundaries set by treaties etc., or where they could potentially do more without 
raising the ire of the central government (or supranational), is less important to 
this type of research.  
 
The hypotheses will be tested with the help of data from the Flemish Department 
of Foreign Affairs, and with data gathered on the foreign affairs of Belgium and 
Flanders from various sources covering the years 2012-2014.  
 
The other part of this study is a case study of the unique situation that the two 
regions found themselves in in the political crisis 2007-11. One could expect that 
should a vacuum be there, and perceived as such, the two regions would 
immediately seek to fill it to their advantage. It is unlikely that new initiatives can 
be established without a Foreign Minister at the head, but bureaucracies may 
naturally continue with previously established initiatives. If there was indeed a 
vacuum, the interesting aspect is where, in what policy areas, this created 
opportunities for the regions to pursue own objectives. 
 
Hypotheses were created deductively, but have been changed inductively in light 
of new evidence collected when testing their validity. 
 
The crisis may however be seen through a basic rational choice institutionalist lens 
in the sense that one of the two opposing forces (the central government, the 
constricting institution) is more or less incapacitated. The weaker one force is, the 
more opportunity there is for the other. Whether the EU is a constraining or 
enabling force will be interesting to see. With a sociological institutionalist angle 
one could expect the institutions to develop norms or ways of functioning that 
cause the regions and bureaucracies to function normally. This was indeed the 
view of interviewee Bart van Laethem.  
To elaborate, since the actors (the regional governments) may use institutions to 
maximise their utility, one can also see the institution as constraining their 
behaviour.
 The	  case:	  Belgium	  without	  government	  
 
In this section, I will provide an overview of the case. 
 
In the years 2007-11 Belgium went through a major political crisis: the summer 
2007 election was won by an alliance of the Flemish Christian Democrats and the 
New Flemish Alliance. A government was finally formed under Yves Leterme after 
almost 200 days of negotiation. The Leterme government however only lasted 
until December 2008, when he resigned as Prime Minister. The future ‘President’ 
of the EU, Herman van Rompuy formed a new government and earned great credit 
as a mediating figure. The relatively stable period under Rompuy was cut short by 
his election to higher office, as President of the European Council.  
The second Leterme government did not last long either, falling in April 2010. 
 
This led to new elections that showed a massive split across the country: the 
separatist New Flemish Alliance won (in Belgium terms) a landslide in Flanders, 
while the pro-unity Socialist Party won as convincingly in Wallonia. This may reflect 
the economic disparities between North and South just as much as nationalist 
sentiment: Wallonia is an old industrial stronghold (once richer, now poorer) and 
Flanders an export-oriented service-based economy.   
 
The Belgian central Parliament was unable to decide on a government for 541 
days in 2010-11, a world record. The government that was eventually formed 
lasted less than three years before the current one was formed under Charles 
Michel of the French-community Mouvement Reformateur (MR). It consists of the 
MR and several Dutch-community parties. 
 
These developments beg the question: what does it mean for two widely 
empowered regions when their central government is essentially incapacitated for 
several years? Do they see – and do they seize – an opportunity to widen their 
influence? To try things they might not have tried when their older brother is 
looking? 
 
The	  diplomacy	  of	  Flanders	  in	  modern	  times:	  a	  regional	  government	  
within	  a	  nation-­‐state	  within	  a	  supranational	  state	  
 
This section will outline the research on the recent trends in, and framework for 
the diplomatic activities of Flanders and Wallonia that forms the (empirical) base 
of the hypotheses.  
Belgian	  state	  reform	  2010-­‐	  
In 1993 Belgium began a process of federation. The Walloon and the Flemish 
would over the course of a few years be granted a historic amount of powers over 
their own political affairs.  
 
The process of devolution had really begun already in 1970, when the two cultural 
communities were formed.  In 1980 each got its own parliament and government.  
The (d)evolution took off in 1993 when Belgium became an actual federal state. In 
the next two decades more powers were devolved. The regions now possess 
competences in economic matters, culture, town and country planning, nature 
conservation, credit, water, housing, public works, energy, transport, the 
environment, employment, agriculture, education, oversight of local government, 
family policy and foreign trade.  
 
The two regions now also have a significant presence in the diplomatic sphere. 
While it is very modest compared to that of central governments, it is at the 
highest tier if one compares it to other semi-autonomous regions. Only Quebec 
may be thought of as in the same league – and then not even, as the diplomatic 
representatives of Flanders and Wallonia are the only ones of their kind to hold 
official diplomatic status, traveling with the famous diplomatic passport.  
 
Even two decades ago, then, the Flemish were the more ambitious. This section 
will describe the latest activities of the Flemish government, compare them to 
those in the 2000’s, and conclude whether the ambition remains as strong. 
 
The Flemish foreign office is titled, impressively, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. As the name suggests, the Flemish regional government is integrating the 
coordination of Flemish foreign policy into this one agency. This process began in 
2003 with the programme Better Governmental Policy. Part of this programme 
was to improve the coordination and integration of Flemish foreign policy, and may 
be seen as a significant step in its maturing process – the start of the third wave, 
in Criekemans’ terminology.  
This process of integration has continued in the past few years since the latest 
research was published: in 2013, the Flemish government decided to fuse the 
Flanders International Cooperation Agency with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs20.  
Flemish	  activities	  
The economic-diplomatic activities have likewise continued at a high pace, perhaps 
even higher, than in previous years. Flanders has since 2010: 
• Deepened environmental policy cooperation with North Rhine-Westphalia in 
Germany21.  
o Signed a declaration of intent to deepen economic cooperation with 
North Rhine-Westphalia. 
o Expanded its cooperation agreement with Croatia to involve all the 
policy competencies it possesses. 
o Expanded economic and cultural cooperation with Romania and 
Lithuania. 
o Furthered economic and cultural cooperation with Estonia. 
• Made official visits to Quebec and Catalonia. 
• Made trade missions to Turkey and India 
• The minister-president met with the President of Myanmar in both 2012 and 
2013 to conclude a fair amount of trade and cooperation agreements. 
o Was in Vietnam to discuss trade agreements. 
o Was in South 
Africa, Mozambique Malawi and Botswana to discuss trade with 
various ministers. 
o Met with Polish President Komorowskij. 
o Received then-Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker. 
o Received the presidents of Malawi and Mozambique. 
• Been active in international organisations such as UNESCO, ILO, SERV, the 
WHO, WEF and UNWTO, though with no significant changes in the nature of 
this activity: funding, public statements and attending as an observer or 
representative of the Belgian federation as part of the rotation scheme that 
allows Walloon and Flemish representatives to represent the federation. 
 
In the 2000’s, the Flemish had a more significant diplomatic presence compared to 
other regions; only Quebec had more manpower in their foreign office. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs is set to expand its presence abroad, however: the 
new government aims to “further deepen and extend” its representation abroad, 
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and in international institutions22. The amount of staff is however still only a 
fraction of that of the federal government. 
 
Cultural treaties have increasingly been incorporated in either federal activities or 
wider, ‘cooperative’ treaties. The level of active stand-alone cultural treaties has 
fallen from 39 in 2001 to nine in 2007 and nought in 2013.  
One could see this as another integrative trend in Flemish foreign policy, as 
successive governments have sought to fashion a more centrally coordinated 
foreign service where all actors and initiatives are pursuing the same goals. 
Their external cultural relations are not developed independently in the same 
manner as Wallonia’s are through the Francophonie. Cultural issues, then, are 
mostly present at the domestic political level. 
 
Development and trade in the former Dutch colonies in Southern Africa remains a 
priority for the Flemish. Regular trips are made to strengthen knowledge-sharing 
networks and improve the conditions in the area for Flemish business.   
The diamond industry especially is a financially important area for both parties. 
 
In July 2014, a new Flemish government was elected, promising  “an autonomous, 
mature and professional”23 foreign policy and “the implementation of a targeted 
economic and public diplomacy” and “…targeted cultural, academic and public 
diplomacy”.  
This would be a natural development if one sees it as a somewhat linear move 
towards independence. The public diplomacy has been, along with the cultural, 
somewhat less prioritised: economic affairs have been the focus. 
 
Since entering office, the new government under minister-president Geert 
Bourgeois has been following up on its promise to increase its efforts in the 
sphere of public diplomacy. It has opened and hosted the World Travel Market in 
London, the largest of its kind, and opened the Flanders Memorial Garden with 
Filip, King of the Belgians, also in London, giving the new minister-president a 
chance to be seen by a large audience alongside the Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II.  
 
It would be too much to say that a new trend can be identified, but the new 
Flemish government has identified it as a (new) focus point. It will be interesting 
to see to what extent it will follow up on this.  
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The	  interviews	  
On	  Wallonia	  
 
That Wallonia had as little focus on leading an independent foreign policy as was 
the case was of course not expected. However, the loss of relevance that this 
discovery caused was somewhat of a blow to the paper. The data on Flanders is 
nonetheless interesting, and indeed took so much space in such a short time that 
there was none left for the Walloons, so to speak. 
 
The interviewees were selected on the basis of having first-hand experience with 
diplomatic activity for Wallonia and Flanders respectively, and first-hand 
experience with the governmental crisis 2010-11. On the Flemish side, this led to 
the head of the policy-coordinating department of the Flemish Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Bart van Laethem.   
The interview was conducted in a semi-structured manner; the interview plan 
may be seen in Appendix 1. 
 
Has	  the	  Flemish	  foreign	  policy	  changed?	  
 
Qua research question #2: Have the focus points of Flemish foreign policy 
changed over the past five years? 
  
It was expected that Flemish foreign policy would have an unaltered focus on 
economic engagement (hypothesis 1).  
In large part this turned out to be true. As can be seen from the activities 
listed in the above section, the large part of diplomatic missions is related to 
trade.  
It was expected that these activities would reflect a focus that was shifting 
towards Asia. This expectation was fulfilled: high-profile diplomatic missions to 
Turkey, India and Myanmar were conducted in the past three years. One may 
surmise that this is partly due to the accession into the EU of the Eastern Bloc in 
which the Flemish were once very active, and due to the continuously high growth 
rates in Asian economies.  
Mr Laethem also mentioned that their focus was turning towards the MINT 
countries. MINT is an acronym that, like BRIC, refers to four emerging economies. 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) was coined a decade ago in a Goldman Sachs 
report. MINT was also popularised in investment reports, and refers to Mexico, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey. These four emerging economies also boast strong 
growth potentials and include almost half a billion people. It does not however 
seem to be translated into policy just yet. This of course may come soon, as 
political tensions in these countries are soothed (Mexico is in a war with drug 
cartels, Nigeria is challenged by rebels to the north and south, and Turkey has a 
civil war to deal with in Syria and Kurdistan, with all the disturbances that this 
brings). 
Thus there is a definite turn towards new growth markets, particularly Asia. 
 
While it is true that the main focus of Flemish foreign policy remains economic, 
the new regional government, installed in the summer of 2014, has outlined public 
diplomacy as a future focus. This could be a reaction to the only widening 
differences between the Walloon and Flemish economies and governance. Public 
diplomacy indeed seems to intertwine with economic issues: it is important, says 
Laethem, to explain how Flanders works. It is a matter of clarifying the structures, 
norms and such of the Flemish political and business environment. (Foreign) 
investors want safety: this means sound information and a deep knowledge of the 
environment in which they invest their money is of high importance, and Flanders 
is very active in this area.  
 
A policy that lies in this crossfield is that of inviting officials and investors to 
Flanders to describe, “how Flanders works”, and inviting networking at the same 
time. This policy is set to be a priority for the present regional government. In a 
press release24 it is stated that the new government intends to “further deepen 
and extend the network of Government of Flanders representatives abroad”, and, 
that in doing so, “explicit attention will be paid to the representatives to 
international institutions and the EU”.  
It ends: “through a targeted cultural, academic and public diplomacy Flanders’ 
assets will be additionally highlighted abroad.” 
The term public diplomacy may also refer to communicating with the broader 
public sphere. Policies in this area remain unchanged. Flanders Houses continue to 
brand Flanders abroad, and occasional cultural events in and out of Flanders 
continue to be used as temporary stages upon which Flanders may project itself. I 
have not either been able to find actual campaigns, such as the Invest in Wallonia 
campaign that ran full-page advertisements in The Economist, among others, in 
2013. This was somewhat unexpected.  
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Even for the Flemish Department of Foreign Affairs, what may be put inside the 
box called public diplomacy is still subject to discussions. The new regional 
government’s focus on public diplomacy is still to be elaborated and put into 
effect. One more aspect may though be added to the practice: the department 
publishes an online newspaper, Flanders Today, part of the exercise in explaining 
how Flanders works. 
 
Mr Laethem expresses a wish for the near-region to utilise European Union 
opportunities for policy formation, lobbying etc., more than has been the case. Of 
course Flanders is very much involved in trans-border cooperation with the 
Netherlands, but connecting the Benelux countries to Germany as part of a (or 
the) Western European economic powerhouse is a priority. Flanders also looks at 
its near-region – but only the bordering communities; the wider EU sphere is not a 
specific priority. 
 
Through a wider presence on the public-diplomacy arena Flanders is set to 
increase its profile on the international stage. Its continued focus on economic 
diplomacy is unsurprising for an economy as export-oriented as the Flemish.   
 
  
  
  
 Was	  there	  a	  vacuum,	  and	  was	  it	  filled?	  
 
541 days without a federal government could present a challenge for the regional 
governments. The size of the impact depends on how dependent the different 
levels of governance are on each other. We already knew that Belgium was a 
special case. The findings on this matter point to a Belgium with a unique relation 
– or lack thereof – between the different levels of government. 
 
No problems whatsoever. That is what Bart van Laethem experienced at the 
Department of Foreign Affairs.  
As he described it, since the federal government is not placed hierarchically above 
the regional governments. This means that the three governments may act 
independently of each other (bar force majeure situations). Thus there was no 
significant loss of capabilities to maintain existing initiatives or undertake new 
ones.  
While a compliment to the bureaucracies may be adequate, the institutional 
structure allows for the three regional governments to act independently of each 
other, as they deem appropriate. In extreme situations, one party may halt a 
policy initiative of another if they deem it not in the interest of the federation.  
 
When asked if there were any norms restricting their behaviour, Laethem 
answered no. Only structures. The structures were created with the possibility of 
such a government shutdown in mind, with no space at all for actors to interpret 
the legislative framework one way or the other to suit them. It was unexpected to 
be told this; that a legislative framework cannot be interpreted either way. The 
hypothesis reflects the assumed a high likelihood of some recognised and 
significant space for interpretation in the legislation. It may be significant in 
reality, but this paper will not delve into judicial matters though. The space is not 
recognised by the interviewee. 
 
Thus the institutional framework around Flanders seems to have effectively 
constrained it from potentially utilizing this crisis to pursue its foreign policy 
objectives. One may point to critical junctures such as the reform that instituted 
veto powers for the regional and federal governments. Once a veto power is 
established, it is naturally difficult to abolish. 
 
One can certainly also see the effect of the in foro interno, in foro externo 
principle, with Flanders being highly active on for instance economic and 
environmental fronts. The trend outlined in Going Beyond Paradiplomacy25, of 
steadily expanding diplomatic activity capable of being traced back to the 80s or 
even 70s, is still detectable.  
 
It seems also to be clear that there is no substantiated wish from Wallonia to gain 
more autonomy, whereas the Flemish institutions are very much riding the wave.  
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  Conclusion	  
 
The purpose of this paper, put another way, was to answer the research 
questions. How did it do so? 
 
1. Have the focus points of Flemish foreign policy changed over the past five 
years? 
Yes. Public diplomatic activity is increasing, and the new regional government 
installed in June 2014 has made it a priority.  
Flemish economic diplomacy also seems to be directed increasingly towards Asia 
and other emerging economies.   
 
2. Is Flanders developing a more independent foreign policy? 
a. Is Flanders expanding its diplomatic activities? 
 
Flanders has been granted more competencies in the latest round of state reform. 
This has not explicitly changed the makeup of Flemish diplomacy. It is, however, 
expanding its activities in public diplomacy.  
 
3. Did Flanders perceive, and fill a foreign policy vacuum in the 541 days with 
no government? 
 
 It did not. The data gathered for this paper suggests that the Flemish 
government was of the view that there was no vacuum, due to the lack of space 
for interpretation in the institutional and legislative framework, and due to 
mechanisms that allow the Walloon or federal government to block initiatives they 
do not wish to see implemented. 
Thus, in this case, the institutional framework around Flanders seems to be 
constraining it at this level of governance.  
 
This brings us to the hypotheses: with the data gathered through the research, 
were the hypotheses correct? 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Flanders remains more focused on economic diplomacy in the near-
area: the Netherlands and Central and Eastern Europe, but is shifting 
its focus to other areas. 
Flanders is indeed focused on diplomacy in the near-area, including both bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, as well as within the EU. The ‘near-area’ does not 
however include Central and Eastern Europe, but only the regions actually 
bordering Flanders.  
It is, though, shifting focus to Asia and other emerging economies. 
Hypothesis 2  
 
Flanders’ is expanding its activities. 
Flanders is set to expand its activities within public diplomacy. These are already 
well underway. The networking activities; inviting officials to see ‘how Flanders 
works’ is a typical strategy, also mentioned (through Cornago) in the literature 
review. 
Hypothesis 3 
 
The regional government of Flanders perceived a vacuum in the 541 
days with no central government. They sought to fil l this vacuum.   
The regional government did not perceive a vacuum. The interviewee representing 
Flanders did not see any space for this in the legislative/institutional framework.  
	  
Alternative hypothesis 
 
The regional government of Flanders perceived a vacuum, but did not 
seek to fil l it out due to institutional norms. 
The Flemish interviewee did not see a vacuum. He recognized the possibility of 
such a thing, but to his eyes the institutional/legislative framework was so 
inflexible as to nullify this possibility. Thus the institutional framework in this case 
seems to have (and in future cases, will) constrained the behaviour of the Flemish 
regional government significantly.  
This paper set out to investigate the diplomatic activities of Flanders in the past 
three to four years. This has been a fruitious exercise: we have found that 
Flanders exhibits a continuing enhancement of their diplomatic activities, that they 
are branching out into new areas, and that it remains a focus of the government 
to enhance, coordinate and integrate these activities. 
 
The case study incorporated in the paper concerning the Belgian governmental 
crisis 2010-11 was less fruitious in the quantitative sense, but qualitatively 
satisfactory: the interviewee took the view that the institutional framework 
governing Flemish activities is so tightly woven that it fully constrained Flanders 
from potentially further pursuing its foreign policy goals. 
 
 
 
	  Afterthoughts	  
 
What further research could the work here inspire? 
One could certainly attempt to compare the findings to developmental trends in 
other regions in a broader comparative study. 
 
Returning to Cornago’s normalisation processes26, it would be interesting to 
investigate the makeup of the institutional norms that promote the behaviour of 
the Flemish government and its agencies.   
One could want to perform more, and more in-depth interviews in order to verify 
the conclusion of the case study, or to falsify it: could it in fact be institutional 
norms at play?  
 
Another study could be directed at the Francophonie, and sub-state diplomacy 
running via this organisation.  
 
What could also be interesting to see is research on mapping the preferences of 
sub-state actors in terms of autonomy – how does the wish for autonomy affect 
the process of gaining it?   
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